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THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IMPERSONATION: 
A LIBERTARIAN ANALYSIS 
Andy Loo* and Walter Block** 
ABSTRACT 
Impersonation is a criminal act; it constitutes invasion and, in some 
cases, fraud. Although often associated with the term “identity theft,” 
impersonation is primarily a violation of the rights of the recipient of the 
communication, rather than that of the person being impersonated, whose 
rights are only sometimes violated. The present paper is devoted to defending 
this position. It attempts to overcome the objection that there is no violence 
necessarily connected to this act, or that the violence is directed toward the 
person being impersonated instead of the recipient of the impersonating 
message. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose A sends a letter to C in the name of B, without B’s consent. 
From a libertarian standpoint, does such an act possibly, or necessarily, 
constitute any crime? 
For the purposes of this paper, an act of impersonation is defined as the 
sending of a message that appears to come from a person other than the actual 
sender, without the consent of the person from whom the message appears to 
come. We will call the person who sends the message the sender, the person 
who receives the message the recipient, and the person who is being 
impersonated the victim. Thus, A is the sender, B is the victim, and C is the 
recipient.1 
The fact that impersonation is often known as a type of “identity theft” 
seems to suggest that it is primarily a violation of the victim’s rights. 
However, as we will demonstrate in the sections that follow, impersonation 
generally constitutes aggression against the recipient, whereas aggression 
against the victim is only an occasional and secondary implication. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Since this is a libertarian analysis, it behooves us to say at least a few 
words about this political economic philosophy.2 But, we shall refrain from 
being effusive, since this challenge of impersonation confronts other legal 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 See Walter E. Block, The Human Body Shield, 22 J. LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 625, 625 (2011); 
Walter E. Block, Response to Jakobson on Human Body Shields, 2 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 1, 1 (2010). 
2 On libertarianism, see DAVID BERGLAND, LIBERTARIANISM IN ONE LESSON (1986); Walter E. 
Block, Sue for libel?, LEWROCKWELL (Dec. 29, 2008), http://www.lewrockwell.com/block/ 
block124.html; Walter E. Block, Review of Huebert’s Libertarianism Today, LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 
(2010), http://libertarianpapers.org/2010/19-block-review-of-hueberts-libertarianism-today/; HANS-
HERMANN HOPPE, THE ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY: STUDIES IN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY AND PHILOSOPHY (2d ed. 1993); JACOB HUEBERT, LIBERTARIANISM TODAY (2010); JAN 
NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA (1988); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); 
Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., What Libertarianism Is, and Isn’t, LEWROCKWELL (Mar. 31, 2014), http:// 
www.lewrockwell.com/2014/03/lew-rockwell/what-libertarianism-is-and-isnt/; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, 
FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter FOR A NEW LIBERTY: 
THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO]; Tom Woods, The Question Libertarians Just Can’t Answer, 
LEWROCKWELL (June 5, 2013), http://archive.lewrockwell.com/woods/woods237.html; WILLIAM C. 
WOOLRIDGE, UNCLE SAM THE MONOPOLY MAN (1970). 
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theories; indeed, it is difficult to mention one of them which would not, or, 
should not, have a view on this matter. 
So, what is libertarianism? This is a perspective that asks but one 
question, and gives but one answer. The question? When is force, violence, 
justified in law? And the answer? Uninvited border crossings should be legal 
only in self-defense, or in response to a prior violation of the non-aggression 
principle (NAP) of libertarianism.3 That is to say, under libertarian law, each 
person may do exactly as he wishes, with the exception of threatening or 
engaging in murder, rape, theft, kidnapping, or other harmful activities.4 The 
opposite side of this coin of libertarianism involves private property rights 
based on homesteading.5 Libertarian law refers to law that would embody the 
moral code of libertarianism, which is defined by the NAP and the theory of 
property rights.6 The existing statutes in any jurisdiction are not identical to 
libertarian law. We are nevertheless interested in questions about what acts 




5 A theory of property rights is necessary in order to be able to determine whether or not a given 
forced transfer of property is justified; it is, if the owner is seizing it from a non-owner, and not otherwise. 
On homesteading, see Walter E. Block, Earning Happiness Through Homesteading Unowned Land: A 
Comment on “Buying Misery with Federal Land” by Richard Stroup, 15 J. SOC. POL. & ECON. STUDIES 
235 (1990); Walter E. Block, Homesteading City Streets: An Exercise in Managerial Theory, 5 PLAN. & 
MKT. 18 (2002); Walter E. Block, On Reparations to Blacks for Slavery, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS REV. 53 
(2002); Walter E. Block & Michael R. Edelstein, Popsicle Sticks and Homesteading Land for Nature 
Preserves, 7 ROMANIAN ECON. & BUS. REV. 7 (2012); Walter E. Block & Guillermo Yeatts, The 
Economics and Ethics of Land Reform: A Critique of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace’s 
“Toward a Better Distribution of Land: The Challenge of Agrarian Reform,” 15 J. NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENVT’L L. 37 (2000); Per Bylund, Man and Matter: How the Former Gains Ownership of the Latter, 4 
LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 73 (2012); HUGO GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (A.C. Campbell trans., 
London 1814) (1625); HOPPE, supra note 2; Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Of Private, Common, and Public 
Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization, 3 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 1 (2011); Stephan Kinsella, 
A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability, 17 J. 
LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 11–37 (2003); Stephan Kinsella, How We Come to Own Ourselves, LUDWIG VON 
MISES INST. (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.mises.org/story/2291; JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING 
THE TRUE ORIGIN, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1948); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE 
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1955); ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 
(1987); SAMUEL PUFENDORF, NATURAL LAW AND THE LAW OF NATIONS (1673); FOR A NEW LIBERTY: 
THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO, supra note 2; Michael S. Rozeff, Original Appropriation and Its Critics, 
LEWROCKWELL (Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeff18.html; Carl Watner, The 
Proprietary Theory of Justice in the Libertarian Tradition, 6 J. LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 289 (1982). 
6 Rockwell, supra note 2. 
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would or would not be forbidden by libertarian law, if enacted. The questions 
about impersonation that we explore in this paper belong to this category.7 
III. POTENTIAL CRIMES AGAINST THE RECIPIENT 
We argue that an act of impersonation constitutes trespass against the 
recipient, and, in some cases, also the crime of fraud against the recipient 
under libertarian law. 
A. Trespass 
At first thought, it seems that the mere delivery of a message (whether 
in physical or electronic form) cannot possibly violate the property rights of 
the recipient, for the addressee can simply reject or dispose of it. But in 
reality, this is far from the case.8 We demonstrate this point by looking at two 
common ways in which an impersonating message can be sent, namely postal 
mail and email. 
A person typically receives postal mail with a mailbox, which is his 
private property. Delivery of postal mail requires the insertion of letters into 
privately owned mailboxes. While there are no explicitly signed contracts 
between recipients and all possible senders of postal mail as to what material 
can be inserted into the recipient’s mailboxes, tacit contracts nevertheless 
exist.9 Namely, recipients are generally deemed to allow “reasonable” mail 
to be inserted into their mailboxes.10 In the case of unwanted postings, the 
recipient can request that the sender stop transmitting certain types of mail, 
and the latter must comply; if not, the sender would clearly be guilty of a 
trespass.11 Sending unwanted mail can be viewed as a form of trespass upon 
another’s private property.12 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 Id. 
8 Walter E. Block, Roy Whitehead & Stephan Kinsella, The Duty to Defend Advertising Injuries 
Caused by Junk Faxes: An Analysis of Privacy, Spam, Detection, and Blackmail, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 
925, 939 (2006). 
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Since impersonating mail is deceptive in nature and generally undesired 
by recipients, it is sensible to assume that such mail does not fall under the 
“reasonable” mail that recipients are tacitly assumed to accept.13 Thus, by the 
above reasoning, senders of impersonating mail do aggress against the 
recipients of their largesse. 
It is understood that there may be cases where a recipient has explicitly 
authorized the insertion of impersonating mail (or, for that matter, other types 
of generally unwanted mail) into his mailbox, such as when someone puts up 
a sign next to his mailbox saying: “Impersonating mail is welcome!” There 
is also the possibility of sado-masochist contracts between a sender and a 
recipient, whereby the latter agrees to be tortured by the confusion caused by 
receiving impersonating mail. However, these circumstances are rare 
exceptions and should not be included in the interpretation of tacit contracts 
in the general handling of mailboxes. In other words, there is a strong 
presumption that forwarding material of this sort is unwanted, although this 
presumption can be defeated by explicit action of the sort previously 
mentioned. Therefore, if a person explicitly states that he desires unwanted 
material, then it should not be presumed that he does not. 
Another way in which impersonating messages can be sent is via email. 
Like postal mail, email also affects private property in the process of 
delivery. When a person receives an email, programs are run in his computer 
so as to update the status of his email inbox. In other words, the sender causes 
the electronic circuits in the recipient’s computer to engage and operate. 
Since impersonating emails can be presumed to be undesired, sending them 
is a violation of the tacit contract regarding what types of emails which the 
recipient agrees to receive, and by which his computer may be caused to 
operate. Thus, the sending of impersonating emails would constitute trespass 
against the recipient’s private property.14 
                                                                                                                           
 
13 Contra note 18. 
14 Murray N. Rothbard, Law, Property Rights and Air Pollution, 2 CATO J. 121, 233–79 (1982) 
(discusses privity, the idea that a contract may not impose obligations on any party other than those signing 
the it. Applying this concept to the tacit contract between the owner of a mailbox and potential message 
deliverers leads to the question: should it be the postman or the sender who is to be held responsible for 
the trespass? Our response is that it is the former who is responsible. He delivered the unwanted (e.g., 
trespassing) material. However, he lacks mens rea, and, presumably, may properly turn around and sue 
the sender, who is the source of this problematic transfer. If a criminal sends a bomb through UPS, that 
company is not responsible for the resulting mayhem, even though it is the proximate cause thereof. The 
real malefactor is the initiator of this crime, the person who sends the bomb through the mail. A similar 
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B. Fraud 
In addition to trespass, there is a second crime that the sender of 
impersonating messages may commit, though not intentionally, and that is 
fraud.15 Fraud means one’s failure to supply the agreed upon good to the other 
party, as prescribed by a contract, after taking the good that the other party is 
required to supply under the contract.16 Recall that the non-aggression 
principle forbids the seizure or physical alteration of another’s property 
without his consent.17 Such injustice could be committed by overt physical 
violence or by fraud. For example, if X offers to give Y an apple in exchange 
for Y’s orange, and actually gives Y a fake (plastic) apple after receiving Y’s 
(real) orange, X has violated the condition on which Y agrees to give X the 
orange, and has thereby obtained Y’s property without Y’s consent. 
Perhaps counter-intuitively, if a sender uses impersonating messages to 
merely trick the recipient into destroying his own property or transferring his 
property to someone else, the sender has not committed fraud. An example 
of the former would be a collector angrily breaking a precious vase after 
receiving an impersonating phone call that pretends to be an expert telling 
him that the vase is of little value. An example of the latter would be someone 
sending money to some address upon receiving an impersonating email that 
pretends to be a friend needing to borrow money urgently. In order for fraud 
to occur, there must be a contract between the two parties. Suppose A asks 
B, a stranger, what is the time of day? The latter replies, “3:00 p.m.” 
Whereupon the former tears up his lottery ticket, falsely thinking it is no 
longer of any value, since the deadline for cashing in has (seemingly) passed. 
B has not committed fraud on A since they are not contractually related to 
one another. However, if A paid B to tell him the time, then, yes, fraud has 
occurred. 
                                                                                                                           
 
analysis applies to the fake email website owner versus the sender; the former is the proximate cause, 
albeit innocent; the latter is the rights violator, even though indirectly so. Does the sender violate the 
property rights of the post office by putting impersonating mail in the post office’s mailbox? Indeed, the 
sender did commit trespass against the post office; presumably a private one.). Rothbard, supra note 14. 
15 Id. See also MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 77–84 (Mark Brandly et al. eds., 
1998) [hereinafter THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY]. This includes cases of simply supplying nothing or supplying 
a fake item that does not satisfy the requirements of the contract. 
16 Rothbard, supra note 14. 
17 See id. at 45–50. 
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However, it should be stressed most strongly that this crime is strictly 
limited to cases where an actual piece of physical property is forgone, or 
when the physical integrity of the recipient’s property is compromised. It 
does not apply to the recipient’s loss of friendship with or respect for the 
victim, as a result of the misimpression. Mere changes in attitudes and 
thoughts, however regrettable they may be, do not belong to the realm of 
property right violations.18 Of course, this does not in the least detract from 
the generally condemnable nature of mental trickery and sabotage of 
interpersonal relationships.19 
Finally, we note a difference between the circumstances under which 
the sender of impersonating mail commits trespass and fraud: even if the 
sender does not succeed in deceiving the recipient, the fact remains that he 
has shoved unwanted material into the recipient’s mailbox or caused 
unwanted operation in the recipient’s computer, hence violating the 
recipient’s property rights.20 By contrast, a mere unsuccessful attempt at 
fraud does not constitute criminal activity under libertarian law, for there has 
not occurred any nonconsensual seizure or physical alteration of property.21 
IV. POTENTIAL CRIMES AGAINST THE VICTIM 
A. Threat 
Two seemingly obvious crimes that the sender of an impersonating 
message has committed against the victim are identity theft and libel. 
However, as we will elaborate in the next section, identity theft and libel are 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 See THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY, supra note 15; WALTER E. BLOCK, DEFENDING THE 
UNDEFENDABLE (Ludwig von Mises Inst., 3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter DEFENDING THE UNDEFENDABLE]. 
In chapter 7 of the latter book (supporting the legalization of libel and slander), Block explains why mere 
thoughts in peoples’ minds (or changes therein) cannot constitute violations of property rights. 
19 Suppose the sender tricks the recipient into committing a crime against some other individual? 
For example, X falsely tells Y that Z wants his flower beds turned over for mulch. Y obliges, without any 
mens rea at all. Most commentators would contend that X and X alone is the guilty party. We demur. Y 
should be careful about who he listens to. We would hold Y and him alone responsible for the destruction 
of Z’s property. All bets are off if X can somehow hypnotize Y into doing his bidding. We hereby stipulate, 
arguendo, that hypnotism “works” against its innocent targets. In like manner, if voodoo was actually 
capable of inflicting physical harm on its targets, it would have to be outlawed, in the free society. 
20 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
21 For the claim that attempted crimes are not criminal in the libertarian law code, see Law, Property 
Rights and Air Pollution, supra note 14. 
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not, in fact, criminal acts.22 Yet, this does not mean that the victim can never 
have any legal recourse against the sender, for there is one crime that the 
sender may easily have committed against the victim, namely, threat. 
In the libertarian legal code,23 and in that of many other philosophies, 
threats, not only physical violence, are proscribed.24 If the muscle-man says 
to the proverbial 90-pound weakling, “give me your money or I’ll bash you,” 
that is a per se criminal act even if the bully does not need to employ any 
physical violence to attain his nefarious ends. This is the “assault” part of 
“assault and battery.” Thus, libertarians are not absolutists on the issue of 
free speech.25 There are some speech “acts,” that may be considered “threats” 
and thus forbidden under libertarian law. 
If the victim finds out about an impersonating message and perceives a 
threat of physical violence in it, the sender will have committed a crime 
against the victim. For example, suppose A sends in B’s name an email to a 
demolition company asking it to implode B’s house, and B finds out about it 
when the company goes to his house for inspection. If, as a result, B feels a 
threat of personal injury or property destruction from A, then A can be 
charged with the crime of assault, e.g., making a threat.26 
It should be emphasized that the sender does not necessarily have to 
succeed in deceiving the recipient in order for a threat against the victim to 
occur.27 In the above example, suppose the company detects some flaws in 
the impersonating message, concludes that it is fraudulent, and informs the 
victim, B, about it. Even in this case, B may still perceive a threat of personal 
injury of property destruction by A, and is thus entitled to press such a charge 
against A. 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 See discussion infra Part V. 
23 See THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY, supra note 15, at 45–50, for what the libertarian legal code includes. 
24 Ben O’Neill & Walter E. Block, Inchoate Crime, Accessories and Constructive Malice in 
Libertarian Law, 5 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 219, 220 (2013) [hereinafter Inchoate Crime]. 
25 Id. at 239. 
26 Consider the case in which X viciously swings an axe against a wax sculpture of Y; Y sees it and 
perceives a threat against him in this act. Then the present authors claim X has committed a threat against 
Y. For a detailed analysis of cases of this sort, see Inchoate Crime, supra note 24, at 227–28. 
27 See Inchoate Crime, supra note 24, at 226. 
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B. Trespass 
In the previous section we argued that the delivery of impersonating 
messages generally constitutes trespass against the recipient. Actually, the 
sender of impersonating messages may also be committing such a property 
rights violation against other parties. 
There are several methods to make an email appear to be sent from 
someone else other that the erstwhile sender. The first is to create a new email 
account using the victim’s name, and to transmit an email message from that 
account.28 The second is to use computer software or programs to send an 
email such that when the recipient opens it, the “From” line is displayed as 
the victim’s actual email address.29 The third method is to seize control of the 
victim’s computer and then send an email from an already logged-in email 
account.30 The fourth is to hack into the victim’s email account using one’s 
own computer and send an email from there.31 
While the first and second methods do not violate anyone’s property 
rights, and third and fourth most certainly do. To begin with, email data are 
maintained on the servers of the email service provider. When someone 
registers a new email account, he effectively signs a contract with the service 
provider that entitles him to access the data that pertains to his account (and 
to show it to others voluntarily). Therefore, anyone who gains access to the 
victim’s email account (using whoever’s computer) without the latter’s 
permission is, in effect, invading the email service provider’s server. 
Furthermore, a person who does so on the victim’s computer also commits 
                                                                                                                           
 
28 Google’s Gmail Help page shows that this method of impersonation is an existent possibility; 
see Gmail, Gmail Help, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/mail/answer/190735?hl=en (last visited 
May 15, 2017). 
29 See Gregory P. Kruck & S.E. Kruck, Spoofing—A Look at an Evolving Threat, 47(1) J. COMP. 
INFO. SYS. 95, 96 (2006). 
30 See Olivia Becker, Man Fined $2,700 In Unprecedented Facebook ‘Fraping’ Case, VICE NEWS 
(July 8, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/man-fined-2700-in-unprecedented-facebook-fraping-case 
(showing that if one’s electronic device is seized by another person, the second person can send messages 
using the first person’s account). 
31 This piece of news is an example of this technique in practice, thus proving its existence: Clifford 
Lo & Joyce Ng, Regina Ip gets back US $65,000 stolen in email scam, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 7, 
2015), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1705546/regina-ip-gets-back-hk65000-stolen-
email-scam. 
54 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 36:45 
 
Vol. 36, No. 1 (2017) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2017.133 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
trespass against the latter by manipulating his device in a non-consensual 
fashion.32 
There is a reason for the distinction between the third and fourth 
methods. If, say, X hacks into Y’s email account (not computer) using X’s 
own computer, X has not tampered with Y’s property. X has only invaded 
the email service provider’s property (namely, server). 
V. THE EQUILIBRIUM AMOUNT OF IMPERSONATION 
Let us stipulate, based upon the foregoing considerations, that most but 
not all identity theft should be illegal: it is legal if it does not involve any 
tampering with the victim’s property, and if the recipient (tacitly or 
explicitly) agrees to receive impersonating messages. One example is when 
the mailbox provider specifies that impersonating messages are acceptable, 
and customers who are carelessly unaware of this specification sign up for a 
mailbox with this provider. Such customers may then receive impersonating 
messages from time to time that do not violate any rights. 
How much of it will likely arise in the free society? Our contention is 
that that an optimal amount of it will tend to occur. For, if there is “too little” 
of it,33 there will be little or no incentive for precautions against it to arise. 
On the other hand, if there is “too much” of it, countermeasures to it will 
come more and more to the fore. 
There is a similar, but not exactly parallel story to be told with regard to 
libel. This practice too, is not a per se violation of rights.34 If there is very, 
very little of it occurring in the libertarian society, it can be a powerful 
weapon. But as more and more of it occurs, not only will the harm it 
engenders increase at a decreasing rate, the additional damage from more of 
                                                                                                                           
 
32 See Law, Property Rights and Air Pollution, supra note 14 (asserting that the manipulation of 
another person’s device without the latter’s consent constitutes trespass). 
33 Why would there be a taste for this? Sheer bloody-mindedness is our explanation. Some people 
just enjoy making the lives of others less satisfactory. Perhaps there are some good and sufficient socio-
biological explanations for this sort of anti-social behavior. Then, too, there is no accounting for tastes; 
de gustibus non disputandum. See Gene Callahan, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, LUDWIG VON 
MISES INST. (Apr. 27, 2001), https://mises.org/library/de-gustibus-non-est-disputandum; George J. 
Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76, 76 (1977); Edwin 
G. West & Michael McKee, De Gustibus Est Disputandum: The Phenomenon of “Merit Wants” Revisited, 
73 AM. ECON. REV. 1110, 1110 (1983). 
34 See DEFENDING THE UNDEFENDABLE, supra note 18, at 47; see also THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY, 
supra note 15, at 126. 
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it will actually be reduced. Why? Because if slander comes thick and fast, it 
will be less and less likely to have the power to create injury; people will tend 
to ignore it; to not take it at a fixed value; to ask whether or not it is true. 
Mere allegations will not suffice. 
We expect, then, that identity theft will undergo a similar 
metamorphosis. If hardly any of it ever occurs, people will hardly be 
cognizant of it. A bit more, and it can do real injury. More than that, and the 
market will spend more and more resources to counteract it, or people will 
be more cautious in verifying the authenticity of incoming messages, thus 
rendering identity theft relatively ineffective. 
